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THE CHURCH, THE STATE, AND THE EHA:
EDUCATING THE HANDICAPPED IN
LIGHT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
THOMAS F. GUERNSEY*
M. GREY SWEENEY**
I. INTRODUCTION
All parents have the basic right to guide the educational future of their
children.1 Prior to the 1970s, however, it was not unusual for the parents of
a handicapped child to find it difficult, if not impossible, to provide their
child with a genuine opportunity to learn.2 Despite the Supreme Court's
proclamation in 1954 that education, "where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms,"3
handicapped children were routinely excluded from public education or
segregated within it. Congress, responding to the increasingly vocal call for
equal education, took significant steps in 1970 to remedy the inequities by
enacting legislation to help states educate handicapped children, the culmi-
nation of which was the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975 ("EHA").4
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Wayne State University, 1976; LL.M., Temple University, 1980; member, New Hampshire and
Virginia Bars.
** Associate, Heilig, McKenry, Fraim and Lollar, Norfolk, Virginia; B.A., Longwood Col-
lege, 1986; J.D., University of Richmond, 1989; member, Virginia Bar.
1. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
2. See S. THOMAS, LEGAL ISSUES IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 1-6 (1985). Thomas reports that
as recently as 1968, only 38% of handicapped children were being served by public education. Id.
at 3.
3. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). Although Brown involved the ques-
tion of racial segregation, the principles articulated were later used in a number of cases involving
handicapped children. See S. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 4 (discussing the development of case law
relating to discrimination against handicapped children in education).
4. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-61 (1982) (amending Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No.
91-230, § 601, 84 Stat. 175 (1970)).
Congress' efforts to include handicapped children in the public schools actually began in 1966,
when Title VI was added to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Title VI created the
Bureau of Education for the Handicapped (later replaced by the Office of Special Education Pro-
grams) and offered grants to assist states in educating the handicapped. In 1970, Congress re-
placed Title VI with the Education of the Handicapped Act ("EHA"). The EHA added grants
for equipment and facilities to the existing state grant program, but lacked a permanent entitle-
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The EHA, in tandem with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,5
makes state and local educational authorities responsible for ensuring that
handicapped children in their districts receive a "free appropriate public
education" ("FAPE").6 Where public facilities and services are inadequate
to provide a child with a FAPE, the educational agency may be required to
place that child in a private educational facility at no cost to the parent.7
Even when public facilities are adequate to provide a child with a FAPE,
some parents choose to place their child in a private institution. In many
instances, the private institution selected by parents is a parochial or church
sponsored school.8 While public agencies are not required to fund a unilat-
eral private placement,9 they do retain a significant responsibility for ensur-
ing that handicapped children in parochial schools receive special education
and related services.1" Public school authorities, therefore, may find them-
ment program. In 1974, the House and Senate proposed several amendments to the EHA, includ-
ing an entitlement scheme and a timetable for state enactment. These amendments became the
core of the Education of All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, which was signed
into law by President Ford on November 29, 1975. WEINER, Pub. L. 94-142: IMPAcT ON THE
SCHOOLS 14-20 (1985).
5. Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 394 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1982)); see also 34 C.F.R. § 104 (1988) (to effectuate § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act). The Reha-
bilitation Act was enacted on September 26, 1973. Section 504 of the Act, hailed as the first civil
rights statute for the handicapped, states in part: "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual
in the United States... shall, solely by reason of his handicap be excluded from the participation
mn, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance .... "
The EHA is not mandatory - a state may choose not to receive Part B funds and thus exempt
itself from the requirements of the Act. All states, however, have chosen to participate. Section
504 and its regulations require states to do much of what is required by the EHA. A state refusing
Part B funds would receive less money to fulfill the same educational responsibilities. See, e.g.,
New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1982); S-1 v.
Turlington, 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir.) (section 504 requires educational services and procedural
protections) cert denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981); Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) (inadequate educational programming for emotionally disturbed children); How-
ard S. v. Friendswood Indep. School Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (failure to provide
educational programming and procedural protections to brain damaged, emotionally disturbed
child).
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1982); see infra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
7. See 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4)(B) (1982); 34 C.F.R. § 300.401(a)(2) (1988); see also infra notes
37-44 and accompanying text.
8. Although parents have the right to place their children in parochial schools (see cases cited
supra note 1), it is constitutionally impermissible for public educational authorities to do so. See,
e.g., Matter of Jennifer M., 1986-87 EHLR DEC. 508:259 (SEA Wash. 1986).
9. 34 C.F.R. § 300.403(a) (1970).
10. Id. at § 300.451-.452. The regulations specifically provide that state educational agencies
are responsible for ensuring that individualized educational programs are developed and imple-
mented for parochial school children who receive special education or related services from a
public agency. Id. at § 300.341(b)(2).
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selves involved in activities which could be construed as giving state aid to
parochial schools, including providing public services on parochial school
grounds.
In order to meet constitutional scrutiny, such government aid must
have a secular purpose, its primary effect may neither advance nor inhibit
religion, and it must not foster excessive government entanglement with
religion."1 If the special education and related services required by the
EHA and provided by the local agencies do not meet these standards, then
the public authorities, in fulfilling their responsibilities to handicapped chil-
dren in parochial schools, may well be running the risk of violating the
establishment clause.1"
While the Supreme Court has considered many types of state plans to
aid children in parochial schools, 3 it has never specifically addressed the
constitutionality of state aid to handicapped children in parochial schools
under the EHA. However, the Court's recent decision in Aguilar v. Fel-
ton,14 which involved a federal program structured similarly to the EHA,15
provides some indication of the types of services which may be permissible
under the EHA. The decision also casts serious doubt upon the constitu-
tionality of some on-site programs. The Department of Education
11. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The amendment provides, in relevant part, "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion .... ." Id. This prohibition applies to the states as
well as the federal government. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 5 (1947); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
The establishment clause of the first amendment was enacted in 1789 to guard against state
sponsored religion and the evils that the founding fathers associated with it. The concept of a
state religion had been imported from England along with the first colonial charters, and had
engendered the same religious intolerance and minority sect persecution that had driven many of
America's initial settlers to flee England in the first place.
Lengthy, detailed treatments of the history of the establishment clause abound. See, e.g., G.
BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA (1987); R. CORD, SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982); L. LEVY, THE ESTAB-
LISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); W. MILLER, THE FIRST
LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC (1985).
13. Not all aid to children in parochial schools is constitutionally prohibited. See infra note
87 and accompanying text.
14. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
15. Felton involved Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which
authorized funds to be distributed to states to assist educationally deprived children from low
income families. Title I, which was codified at 20 U.S.C. § 2740 (1982), has been superseded by
Chapter I (containing provisions identical to those at issue in Felton), codified at 20 U.S.C. § 3806
(1982).
Both Title I and the EHA are state administered federal programs, and the Department of
Education has recognized significant similarities between the two. See infra note 122 and accom-
panying text.
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("DOE"), however, has consistently taken the position that Felton has no
impact on the implementation of programs under the EHA, stating that it
would "be presumptuous for educational authorities to extend the Felton
decision beyond the circumstances clearly addressed by that case."16
Whether presumptuous or not, educational authorities have continued to
express concern about the permissible scope of their involvement with paro-
chial schools. Some state agencies, purporting to follow the Court's deci-
sions in Felton and its companion case, Grand Rapids School District v.
Ball,17 have adopted policies disallowing on-site programs under the
ERA." Such caution on the part of state and local school officials may be
well advised.
II. THE EHA
A. General Provisions
Congress articulated several purposes in Subchapter I of the EHA: to
ensure that each handicapped child should receive a "free appropriate pub-
lic education" ("FAPE"); to provide special education and related services
designed to meet the unique needs of handicapped children; to ensure the
protection of the rights of handicapped children and their parents; "and to
assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to educate handicapped chil-
dren.""9 To carry out this mandate, states are required to follow a detailed
set of procedural guidelines delineated in the EHA and supporting
regulations.
To meet the requirements of the EHA, local school systems are first
required to identify those children in need of special education.20 Each
child must then be evaluated by a multi-disciplinary team through nondis-
criminatory testing.21 Following testing, the evaluating team determines
whether the child is eligible for special education.22 After the child's eligi-
16. Letter from Secretary of Education William J. Bennett to Chief State School Officers
(Sept. 12, 1985), reprinted in New Inquiry, 2 EHLR 211:372 (1985) [hereinafter Bennett Letter].
17. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
18. See cases cited infra note 128.
19. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1982).
20. Id. at § 1412(2)(c). To qualify as handicapped under the EHA, a child must have been
evaluated as being "mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handi-
capped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, other health impaired, deaf-
blind, multi-handicapped, or as having specific learning disabilities, who because of those impair-
ments need[s] special education and related services." 34 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1970). This regulation
incorporates procedural safeguards concerning testing and evaluations contained in regulations
§ 300.530-.534, discussed infra.
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(C); 34 C.F.R. § 300.532 (1988).
22. 34 C.F.R. § 300.343-.533.
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bility is determined, the local agency develops an individualized education
program ("IEP") with parental participation.23 The IEP must state the
child's present level of educational functioning and articulate both long and
short term educational goals and objectives.24 A placement decision is then
made based on the goals and objectives contained in the IEP.25 The local
agency must review the IEP at least annually,26 and the child must be re-
evaluated at least every three years.27
Procedural protections for handicapped children include parental in-
volvement in many stages of educational decision-making2" and the parents'
right to request a due process hearing if at any point during the process they
disagree with the local agency.2 9 Any party dissatisfied with the outcome of
the administrative hearing may appeal to the state agency for an impartial
review.30 Further review may be sought through a suit filed in either state
or federal court.31
It was not intended, however, that parents shoulder the ultimate burden
of assuring the rights of handicapped children under the EHA. To qualify
for Part B funds,32 state educational authorities must assume the responsi-
bility of effecting a policy that assures a FAPE is being provided by local
agencies to all handicapped children.33 Each state is charged with the task
of devising and implementing its own program to monitor the performance
of its public schools in providing special education and related services."
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19); 34 C.F.R. § 300.345.
24. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19); 34 C.F.R. § 300.346.
25. 34 C.F.R. § 300.552; see also 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. C, Question 42 at 84 (1988) (IEP
objectives must be written before placement).
26. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(4), 1414(a)(5); 34 C.F.R. § 300.343(d).
27. 34 C.F.R. § 300.534.
28. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(a)(1)(C)(ii), 1415(b)(1).
29. Id. at § 1415(b)(2).
30. Id. at § 1415(c).
31. Id. at § 1415(e)(1).
32. Pub. L. No. 94-142 is often referred to as Part B of the Education of the Handicapped
Act. Part B funds, therefore, refers to monies provided under the entitlement program added to
the Act by Pub. L. 94-142. See Wing Inquiry, 2 EHLR 211:414 (1986).
Funding under the EHA is determined on a state by state basis according to the number of
handicapped children served. The number of handicapped children ages three to twenty-one,
inclusive, who are receiving special education and related services is multiplied by a figure equal-
ling forty percent of the average national expenditure per pupil in elementary and secondary
schools during the second fiscal year preceding the year of computation. The figure determined by
the formula represents a ceiling on the amount of funds to which a state is entitled, not the actual
amount a state will receive. P. JONES, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FEDERAL SPECIAL EDUCATION
LAW: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING P.L. 94-142 36-37 (1981); see also 20 U.S.C.
§ 1411 (entitlements and allocations).
33. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1).
34. Id. at § 1413(a)(11).
1989]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
However, Congress was more specific in articulating the ways in which lo-
cal agency interaction with private schools should be supervised, and states
must follow a more detailed set of guidelines to ensure that private school
handicapped children receive the special education and related services to
which they are entitled.
B. Special Provisions Related to Private Schools
State and local educational agencies retain significant responsibility for
children placed in private school settings. In fact, when a public agency
places a child in a private school, it remains ultimately responsible for en-
suring that the provision of special education and related services conform
with the child's IEP.35 Even for children unilaterally placed in private
schools (including parochial schools), the public school system retains sig-
nificant responsibility for providing special education and related services.36
1. Private Placement by Public Authority
Under some circumstances, an educational agency may be required to
place or refer a child to a private educational facility in order to provide a
FAPE.37 When this occurs, the public agency retains responsibility for pro-
viding that child with special education and related services in conformity
with the child's IEP.38 Furthermore, the public agency is responsible for
ensuring that the IEP meets the same standards that would be required
were the child placed in a public school.3 9 Thus, for example, the local
agency must monitor compliance with requirements for developing the IEP,
such as parental participation and appropriate development of IEP goals
and objectives.' This holds true even if the child is placed outside the dis-
trict, or even outside the state.41
The placing agency must also provide the private education at no cost to
the parents,42 and ensure that the child placed shall have all the rights of a
child who is directly served by the public agency.43 Consistent with these
35. 34 C.F.R. § 300.401(a)(1).
36. Id. at § 300.451.
37. See 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.401(a)(2).
38. 34 C.F.R. § 300.401(a)(1).
39. Id.
40. Id. (incorporating by reference regulations 34 C.F.R. § 300.340-.349).
41. Werner Inquiry, 2 EHLR 211:289 (1982); see infra note 46 for a discussion of educational
authorities' responsibility for handicapped children placed unilaterally outside the home state of
residence.
42. 34 C.F.R. § 300.401(a)(2).
43. Id. at § 300.401(b). The private placement must meet the standards that apply to state
and local educational agencies. Id. at § 300.401(a)(3).
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obligations to privately placed students, the state agency is obligated to
monitor local agency compliance with these requirements through such
techniques as written reports, on-site visits, and parental questionnaires.'
2. Unilateral Private Placement
Even if the local educational agency has an available FAPE, but the
parents choose to place their child in a private placement, public educa-
tional authorities retain significant obligations toward that child under the
EHA. Clearly, while the public agency need not pay for the general educa-
tion of the child at the private placement,4" both the state and local agencies
remain responsible for providing the child with special education and re-
lated services.46 Local agencies are instructed specifically to "provide spe-
cial education and related services designed to meet the needs of private
school handicapped children residing in the jurisdiction of the agency."'47
The provision of special education and related services, of course, incorpo-
rates substantive and procedural requirements including evaluation, eligibil-
ity, and IEPs.48 The state agency, in turn, has the obligation to ensure
compliance with these requirements. 49
3. Services Required for Private School Placements
The Education Department General Administrative Regulations ("ED-
GAR") articulates additional specific responsibilities of educational agen-
cies for the delivery of special education and related services to children
placed in private programs5 0 The thrust of the EDGAR provisions, which
44. Id. at § 300.402(a). When a child is placed in or referred to a private school by a public
agency, the state educational authority must also provide those institutions with copies of applica-
ble state standards, and allow them an opportunity to participate in the development of those
standards which apply to them. Id. at § 300.402(b)-(c).
45. Id. at § 300.403(a).
46. This holds true even when the parents make a unilateral placement outside the state. The
home residence of the child retains primary responsibility for special education and related serv-
ices, and school funds from the local agency of residence may be expended for that child. See
Pagano Inquiry, 2 EHLR 211:454 (1987); Wing Inquiry, 2 EHLR 211:414 (1986). Earlier Office
of Special Education Programs opinions also indicate that the local agency in the state of place-
ment must design its special education programs so as to allow out of state children placed in the
district to participate in the local programs if they so desire. See Beiker Inquiry, 2 EHLR 211:388
(1985); Bliton Inquiry, 2 EHLR 211:97 (1979).
47. 34 C.F.R. § 300.452(a). Note that the regulations define "private school handicapped
children" as those children placed by someone other than the public agency. Id. at § 300.450.
48. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
49. 34 C.F.R. § 300.451(a).
50. Id. at § 76.651-.662 (1987). The EDGAR regulations apply to all recipients of funds
under federal education programs, and thus apply to both state and unilateral private placements
under the EHA. Id. at § 76.650.
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are incorporated by reference in the EHA regulations,"l is to ensure that
children in public and private schools benefit equally from state-adminis-
tered federal programs.52
Under EDGAR, public agencies must consult with private schools on
matters including which children will receive benefits, how the children's
needs will be identified, what benefits will be provided, and how the provi-
sion of services will be evaluated. 3 For specific children, the public agen-
cies must provide a genuine opportunity for students to participate in
special education programs. 4 For example, if the educational program
takes place away from the private school, the public agencies must provide
transportation both to and from the private school.55 The programs must
be provided in a manner consistent with the number of eligible private
school students and their needs. 6
The public agencies must provide comparable benefits to private school
children, including quality, scope, and opportunity for participation. 7 ED-
GAR requires the same benefits to be made available to private school chil-
dren as public school children where the children have the same needs and
are in the same grade, age, or attendance area. Mere inconvenience or
cost does not excuse the public agencies from these responsibilities. For
example, public agencies have been ordered to provide toileting and writing
assistance to children placed in private schools.5 9
The public agencies may not spend less on the special education and
related services of private school children than on public school children
simply because they are not in the public school. EDGAR requires the
public agency to expend the same average amount on private and public
school children if the average cost of meeting their needs is the same." If
51. 34 C.F.R. § 300.451(b).
52. See Wing Inquiry, 2 EHLR 211:414 (1986).
53. 34 C.F.R. § 76.652(a)(l)-(5).
54. Id. at § 76.651(a)(1).
55. Eg., Wheatland Unified School Dist., 1986-87 EHLR DEC. 508:310 (SEA Cal. 1987);
Lakeside Union School, 1985-86 EHLR DEC. 507:125 (SEA Cal.. 1985). But see infra notes 130-
31 and accompanying text.
56. 34 C.F.R. § 76.651(a)(2).
57. Id. at § 76.654(a).
58. Id. at § 76.654(b).
59. Matter of the Board of Educ., 1984-85 EHLR DEC. 506:309 (SEA N.Y. 1984). To the
extent that a child placed in a private school requires exclusively special education and related
services, the public school may be relieved of any obligation to provide education and related
services if it has an appropriate program in the public school. Work v. McKenzie, 661 F. Supp.
225, 229 (D.D.C. 1987).
60. 34 C.F.R. § 76.655(a).
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the average cost is different, a different amount must be spent.61 In other
words, the benefits provided should be based on the child's individual
needs, not on the placement of the child.
The regulations allow the public agency to hire employees of the private
school to provide the required services, if the services are provided outside
the employees' normal work day, and the services are performed by em-
ployees under public supervision and control 62 Further, the services may
be provided at the private school site.63
Note that many of the EDGAR provisions discussed above, as well as
some EHA requirements, necessitate various degrees and forms of public
agency contact with private schools, and specifically sanction on-site pro-
grams and the use of parochial school personnel. Such contacts may pose
separation of church and state problems for public agencies when applied to
handicapped children in parochial schools.
III. SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
The public agency's obligation to serve handicapped children in paro-
chial schools under the EHA and EDGAR may often conflict with the
Constitution's establishment clause.6' Although the Supreme Court has
not had occasion to address the possible conflicts between the EHA and the
establishment clause, it has analyzed many other cases involving state aid to
parochial schools. The Court's approach to "parochiaid ' ' 65 cases has
evolved over the past forty years from the neutrality rule of Everson v.
Board of Education 66 to the trifurcated test of Lemon v. Kurtzman,67 which
has been applied by the Court since 1971 and which was the basis for the
Court's decisions in Grand Rapids School District v. Ball61 and Aguilar v.
Felton.69 At each step, the Court has refined and re-defined the parameters
of permissible state aid to parochial schools. The evolution of the Court's
parochiaid decisions warrants brief examination, as it provides a conceptual
framework by which to analyze the implications of the Ball and Felton
decisions.
61. Id. at § 76.655(b).
62. Id. at § 76.660.
63. Id. at § 76.659.
64. See text of clause supra note 12.
65. This term has been used by some authors to refer to state aid to parochial schools. See,
e.g., Comment, Shared Time Instruction in Parochial Schools: Stretching the Establishment Clause
to its Outer Limits, 89 DICK. L. REv. 175, 175 (1984).
66. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
67. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
68. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
69. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
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A. Neutrality: Everson v. Board of Education
The Supreme Court had addressed the issue of state aid to, and regula-
tion of, parochial schools prior to 1947,70 but it had not encountered a chal-
lenge to such state action on first amendment grounds until Everson v.
Board of Education.71 Everson involved a New Jersey statute authorizing
the reimbursement of parents of public and Catholic school children for bus
fares used to transport the children to and from school. The statute was
challenged on first amendment grounds by taxpayers who argued that the
reimbursements amounted to illegal state support of church schools. 72
Justice Black, writing for the majority, began his treatment of the issue
by indulging in a lengthy historical analysis of the establishment clause in
an attempt to discern its original purpose.73 After invoking the writings of
Madison and Jefferson as further proof of the intent behind the clause,7 4 the
Court advanced the following definition:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another.... No person can
be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbe-
liefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activi-
ties or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the af-
70. See, e.g., Cochran v. Board of Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 374 (1930) (unsuccessful due process
challenge to a Louisiana statute authorizing the loan of secular textbooks to all school children,
including those in parochial schools); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)
(parents have the right to send their children to a parochial school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (state legislatures have a limited right to regulate private schools in the public
interest under the police power).
71. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
72. The statute was also unsuccessfully challenged on due process grounds. See id. at 5-6.
73. See id. at 8-14. The Everson Court has been criticized by advocates of state aid to reli-
gious schools for its capsulated historical justification for its holding, despite the fact that this
particular program was upheld. See, e.g., G. BRADLEY, supra note 12, at 2-3; R. CORD, supra
note 12, at 17. The Everson Court, however, was not the first to entertain such historical reflection
in an establishment clause opinion. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
74. The Court quotes Thomas Jefferson's "Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty" (1786) and
James Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessment" (1785). Everson,
330 U.S. at 12-13. Although these documents concerned the disestablishment of Virginia's state-
sponsored church, not the first amendment, the Court explained that the writings were equally
applicable to the first amendment because of their authors' leading roles in the drafting of that
amendment. Id. at 12 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)). But see G.
BRADLEY, supra note 12, at 3 (calling the Court's analogy an unexplained "historical
convergence").
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fairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the
words of Jefferson, the clause against the establishment of religion
by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church
and State."7
Later in the opinion, these guidelines were distilled into a single, over-
riding concept: neutrality. The Court stated that the establishment clause
"requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious
believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adver-
sary."76 Using the neutrality rule, the Court concluded that since the fares
of children attending parochial schools were paid directly to parents as part
of a general program to help all parents transport their children safely to
and from school, regardless of religion, the program did not breach the wall
between church and state.77 To hold otherwise, the Court intimated, might
prohibit the state from applying general state law benefits to all citizens
without regard to their religious convictions.78
It is important to note that had the neutrality approach of Everson sur-
vived to the present day, there would be fewer questions about the validity
of state aid to handicapped children in parochial schools under the EHA.
The EHA requires states to provide special education and related services
to all children, whether in public, private, or parochial schools. Under Ev-
erson, therefore, withholding EHA benefits from handicapped children in
parochial schools could be construed as denying the child's rights based on
the religious convictions of his parents. Since Everson, however, the ques-
tion presented by parochiaid cases has not been whether public benefits
should be provided to children in parochial schools, but how those benefits
may be delivered so as not to violate the separation of church and state.
This altered focus prompted the Court to begin to develop workable criteria
for determining the validity of laws under the establishment clause, the cul-
mination of which was the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman.79
75. Everson, 330 U.S. 15-16 (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164) (citation omitted).
76. Id. at 18. This type of "effect neutral" approach had been used by the Court decades
before to defeat a due process challenge to a textbook loan program in Cochran, 281 U.S. 370.
Defending the program's assistance to parochial school children, the Cochran Court stated that
the statute's "interest is education, broadly; its method, comprehensive. Individual interests are
aided only as the common interest is safeguarded." Id. at 375.
77. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. Despite its neutrality, it is likely that this program would fail the
effects prong of the Lemon test if considered today. See infra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
78. Id. at 16.
79. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). For a discussion of the cases relied on by the Lemon Court, see infra
note 84.
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B. Lemon v. Kurtzman: Neutrality Revisited
Lemon v. Kurtzman80 involved establishment clause challenges to pro-
grams enacted by Rhode Island and Pennsylvania. The Rhode Island stat-
ute authorized salary supplements for teachers of secular subjects in non-
public schools. In application, the act's sole beneficiaries were 250 teachers
in Catholic schools." Similarly, the Pennsylvania act reimbursed private
schools for teacher salaries, texts, and instructional materials in secular sub-
jects, and the majority of schools which received funds were parochial
schools.82
The Court's analysis began with a passing nod to Everson, noting that
Justice Black had considered the subject matter of that case on the edge of
"forbidden territory" under the establishment clause.83 Acknowledging
that analysis was made even more difficult by the opaque language of the
clause, the Court proceeded to look to past decisions for guidance and
found that three criteria must be met for a state parochiaid program to be
constitutional. The legislation must have a secular purpose, must not have
the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and must
not cause an excessive entanglement between government and religion.84
80. Id. at 606-07.
81. Id. at 608.
82. Id. at 609-10.
83. Id. at 612.
84. Id. at 612-13.
The Court cited Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) as the source of the secular
purpose and effect neutral prongs of its test. Allen involved a textbook loan program for all stu-
dents in grades seven to twelve, whether in public or private school. The Allen Court adopted a
test first announced in Abingtdon School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), that "to with-
stand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion." Id., 374 U.S. at 222. The Court up-
held the program in Allen, noting that the Schempp Court's citation to Everson, which involved a
direct aid program similar to the one challenged in Allen, made the otherwise difficult Schempp
test unusually easy to apply. Allen, 392 U.S. at 243; see Everson, 330 U.S. 1. But see Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (statute which made free textbooks available to students in both
public and private schools, regardless of the school's policy on discrimination, held unconstitu-
tional; discussion of inapplicability of Everson and Allen).
The Court pulled the third prong of the Lemon test from Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664
(1970), a case addressing property tax exemptions for religious organizations. After determining
that the tax exemptions had a neutral legislative purpose, neither advancing nor inhibiting reli-
gion, the Walz Court stated that the inquiry could not end there, that there must be a finding
"that the end result - the effect - is not an excessive government entanglement with religion."
Id. at 674.
Since Lemon, the Court has cautioned that the three-pronged test was meant to serve as a
framework for constitutional inquiry, not as a limit to it. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,
358-59 (1975).
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The Court invalidated both statutes, finding that the programs would
foster "excessive and enduring entanglement between state and church." 5
Distinguishing the decision from Board of Education v. Allen,86 the Court
explained that the textbooks provided to students in that case could be
monitored for religious content, 7 thus ensuring that state money was not
spent to advance religion. The state could not, however, monitor parochial
schools to guarantee that classes taught by state subsidized teachers were
devoid of impermissible religious content without "comprehensive, discrim-
inating, and continuing state surveillance." 8 Such surveillance, said the
Court, would result in excessive church-state entanglement. The Court also
found that the Pennsylvania program provided funds directly to church
schools, another defect which would inevitably result in excessive entangle-
ment through the necessary administration and surveillance which accom-
pany such arrangements. 9
After Lemon, the Court proceeded to apply the three-part test to nu-
merous programs providing state aid to parochial schools.90 While always
quick to note that not all programs which confer incidental or indirect ben-
efits on religious institutions are prohibited,91 the Court rejected numerous
aid plans for having the primary effect of advancing religion. For example,
the Court struck down statutes authorizing direct money reimbursements
to parochial schools for state-mandated expenditures, such as testing9 2 and
85. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625. The Court specified three criteria to be used when determining
whether government entanglement with religion is excessive: (1) the purposes and character of
the organizations benefitted; (2) the nature of aid provided by the state; (3) the resulting church-
state relationship. Id. at 615. Another important consideration for the Court is the way in which
aid is delivered; direct subsidies seem more likely to violate the clause in the Court's eyes. Id. at
621.
86. 392 U.S. 236; see also supra note 84.
87. 403 U.S. at 621. Although the Pennsylvania program also included textbooks for chil-
dren, the funds were furnished to the parochial school for the purchase of the texts. In Allen, the
texts were purchased by the state and loaned directly to the children.
88. Id. at 619.
89. Id. at 621. However, direct funding alone does not automatically render a statute uncon-
stitutional. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 658 (1980).
90. In application, the Lemon test has become a two-part test. The first prong of the test is
quite easy to meet, since the Court accepts without question legislative pronouncements of secular
purpose and has never invalidated a statute for lack of a secular legislative purpose. See, eg.,
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983) (accepting secular purpose of statute authorizing
tax deductions for parents who send children to private and parochial schools on its face); Com-
mittee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973) ("We do not question the propriety,
and fully secular content, of New York's interest ....").
91. See, e.g., Meek, 421 U.S. at 359; Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 771.
92. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472, 481 (1973). The New York statute at
issue in Levitt provided funds for both standardized testing and internally prepared tests. The
Court found that most of the testing funded was of the latter type, and it was these tests with
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maintenance and repair of school facilities, 93 because the statutes did not
ensure that the funds would not be used to advance religious interests, such
as testing religious themes or repairing buildings used for religious pur-
poses. Similarly, statutes authorizing the purchase or loan of instructional
materials and equipment for use in parochial schools were held unconstitu-
tional.9 4 The Court found that the integration of religious and secular edu-
cation in parochial schools was so great that, despite the secular nature of
the equipment, aid to the educational function of these schools had the pri-
mary effect of advancing religion."
The Court found violations of the excessive entanglement prong of its
test as well, and also identified the crucial element of "a nonentangling aid
program: the ability of the State to identify and subsidize separate secular
functions carried out at the school, without on-the-site inspections being
necessary to prevent diversion of the funds to sectarian purposes."9 6 Thus,
the provision of remedial and accelerated instruction and guidance counsel-
ing on parochial school grounds was found to cause excessive entanglement
between government and religion, because the state would be required to
monitor teachers and counselors to ensure religious neutrality. 97 The Court
which the Court took issue, noting that "no means are available, to assure that internally prepared
tests are free of religious instruction." Id. at 480. Statutes authorizing reimbursement of paro-
chial schools for state-mandated standardized testing, the content of which was determined by
public school personnel, have been upheld by the Court. See Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (upholding the
New York statute enacted in response to Levitt); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
93. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756. For a fuller discussion of Nyquist, see infra notes 139-41 and
accompanying text.
94. See Wolman, 433 U.S. at 229; Meek, 421 U.S. at 349. While the program invalidated in
Meek authorized the loan of materials and equipment directly to the parochial schools, the Wol-
man statute presented a different twist. The secular materials and equipment in Wolman were
loaned to pupils or their parents on request and were merely stored on nonpublic school premises,
an arrangement similar to many book lending programs. The Court, however, refused to distin-
guish Wolman from Meek on this ground, stating that "[d]espite the technical change in legal
bailee, the program in substance is the same" as the one in Meek, and thus still inevitably supports
the religious endeavors of the school. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 250 (citing Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756) for
the proposition that aid to parochial schools cannot be made constitutional simply by indirect
delivery).
95. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 248-49; Meek, 421 U.S. at 366.
96. Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 765 (1976). Roemer was the last in a
trilogy of cases addressed by the Court in the 1970s dealing with state aid programs to religiously
affiliated colleges and universities. The Court consistently held that the institutions of higher
learning, unlike religiously affiliated elementary and secondary schools, were not pervasively sec-
tarian, and thus supervision was not required to insure secularity of state funds. Id. at 765-66; see
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
97. Meek, 421 U.S. at 370-72. The Meek Court also invalidated a provision relating to speech
and hearing services, but did so only because it was not severable from the other portions of the
act. Id. at 371 n.21; see Wolman, 433 U.S. at 242-43 (discussing the Meek Court's actions with
regard to speech and hearing services).
[Vol. 73:259
ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE
held that speech, hearing, and psychological diagnostic services, however,
would not create excessive entanglement.98 The services' lack of educa-
tional content removed the risk of impermissible fostering of religious
views, thereby alleviating the need for the surveillance which causes
entanglement.99
Through the myriad of parochiaid decisions, a common defect emerged
in many of the plans rejected as violative of the establishment clause: a lack
of state control. State programs failed the effects test when the state could
not guarantee the secularity of state aid, thus creating the impermissible
effect of advancing religion if the aid was used for sectarian purposes. The
excessive entanglement test was violated if a program required monitoring
to ensure that state aid was used only for secular education, unless the na-
ture of the aid provided by the state removed the risk of advancing religion.
Yet the clause was not violated by general aid programs where benefits
flowed directly from the state to the student, with little or no sectarian in-
put or control, even if indirect benefits were conferred upon parochial
schools.
For this reason, programs under the EHA do not seem to be affected by
the Court's decisions in the wake of Lemon. State and local educational
agencies make special education and related services available directly to
the handicapped student, not to the parochial school as a whole. Any bene-
fit conferred on the parochial school, therefore, is strictly incidental to the
fulfillment of the rights of the handicapped child. Thus, the state can theo-
retically guarantee the secularity of state aid provided to handicapped chil-
dren under the EHA, because the state itself expended the funds for the
provision of such aid. Monitoring of the type which would create excessive
entanglement is unnecessary.
The Court's decisions in Grand Rapids School District v. Ball" and
Aguilar v. Felton,"l however, make it clear that increased state control over
aid programs which affect parochial schools is often not enough to prevent
a violation of the establishment clause. Indeed, Ball and Felton show that
increased state control over on-site programs at parochial schools can pose
additional effects tests and entanglement problems, some of which cannot
be evaded by the EHA.
98. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 244. The Wolman Court also upheld the provision of therapeutic
services performed on non-public school grounds. Id. at 247-48.
99. Id. at 244.
100. 473 U.S. 373.
101. 473 U.S. 402.
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C. Ball and Felton: Expansion of Effects and Entanglements
In Grand Rapids School District v. Ball,"'2 the Court considered a first
amendment challenge to Grand Rapids' Shared Time and Community Edu-
cation programs. The programs were designed to enrich the core curricu-
lum of nonpublic schools (most of which were religious schools) by
providing supplementary classes at public expense. The classes were con-
ducted by state-paid teachers 10 3 in rooms located in and leased from the
private schools. Each room leased by the school system was required to be
free of religious symbols, and during supplementary class periods, a sign
announcing that the room was a public school classroom was posted on the
door.' 4
The Court .was unimpressed with Grand Rapids' efforts to protect its
public classes from the religious influence of the sectarian schools, and
found the programs violative of the establishment clause in three ways.
First, since the teaching took place in the parochial school, the pervasive
sectarian atmosphere might influence state paid teachers to subtly indoctri-
nate the students at public expense. Second, the symbolic union of the state
and parochial schools might convey a message to the students or to the
public at large of state support for religion. Finally, the programs had the
effect of subsidizing parochial schools by taking over their responsibility for
teaching many secular subjects, thus freeing resources that could be used
for religious purposes. 105
In Aguilar v. Felton, ° 6 decided the same day as Ball, the Court ad-
dressed New York's implementation of Title I of the Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education Act of 1965.107 Under the Title I program, states used
federal funds to assist schools in providing special education services for
educationally deprived children from low-income families by implementing
102. 473 U.S. 373.
103. Id. at 375. The Shared Time teachers were full-time public employees, while the Com-
munity Education teachers were part-time public employees who had full-time jobs at the private
school, and commenced teaching for the state at the end of the regular school day. Id. at 376.
104. The signs read in part "THE ACTIVITY IN THIS ROOM IS CONTROLLED
SOLELY BY THE GRAND RAPIDS PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT." Id. at 378 n.2.
105. Id. at 385, 397.
106. 473 U.S. 402. For a general criticism of Felton, see Lines, The Entanglement Prong of
the Establishment Clause and the Needy Child in the Private School: Is Distributive Justice Possi-
ble?, 17 J. OF L. & EDuc. 1 (1988).
107. By the time Felton was decided, Title I, which had been codified at 20 U.S.C. § 2701,
had been replaced by Chapter I of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, 20
U.S.C. § 3801. The Court noted that the "provisions concerning the participation of children in
private schools under Chapter I are virtually identical to those in Title I." Felton, 473 U.S. at 404
n. 1. Since the Court chose to refer to the program as Title I, for convenience sake the program
will be referred to in this Article by the same name.
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programs developed by local educational agencies and approved by state
agencies. A majority of the children assisted by the New York programs
attended parochial schools.'" 8 In practice, the Court found the New York
program very similar to the ones challenged in Ball: Classes were taught
by public school teachers during the regular school day, on parochial school
premises in clearly designated classrooms devoid of religious symbols. In
addition, however, New York had instituted a system for monitoring Title I
classes in parochial schools in an effort to keep them free of religious
content. 109
Despite the possibility that New York's surveillance system might pre-
vent Title I classes from being used to indoctrinate students at state ex-
pense, thus alleviating one concern presented in Ball, the Court held the
program unconstitutional because the surveillance itself created an exces-
sive entanglement of church and state." 0 The Court explained that the
"nature of the interaction of church and state in the administration" '' of
Title I created the fatal elements of entanglement. First, the aid was "pro-
vided in a pervasively sectarian environment," making it impossible to sepa-
rate and subsidize only secular functions." 2 Second, since the aid provided
was in the form of teacher support, a system of ongoing inspections was
necessary to guarantee instructional secularity." 3
Clearly, the concepts articulated by the Court in Ball and Felton leave
states in a difficult dilemma with regard to aid to parochial school children
involving on-site programs. State-paid or state-provided teachers in paro-
chial schools seem to be an insurmountable stumbling block." 4 The poten-
tial for religious indoctrination of students by public teachers is ever-present
because of the pervasive sectarian atmosphere of parochial schools, yet the
state is forbidden to attempt to control its teachers through surveillance
because such efforts would foster entanglement. Additionally, states must
avoid two new effects: appearances and indirect subsidies. To avoid the
appearances effect, the program must not create the appearance of church-
state unity because of the danger of conveying a message of state support
for religion to students or the public. Of greater significance, however, is
108. Felton, 473 U.S. at 406.
109. Id. at 406-07.
110. Id. at 409.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 412; see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
113. Id.
114. The Court had previously addressed the problems presented by aid in the form of teach-
ers in Meek, 421 U.S. 349 and Lemon, 403 U.S. 602. However, the Court struck down these
programs under the entanglement prong of its test, and did not directly address the effects
problems inherent in its analysis until Ball.
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the indirect subsidies effect. Previously, states were required to ensure only
that public aid was not being wrongfully diverted to, sectarian purposes,
thus directly subsidizing religious activity. Now states must also examine
the extent and nature of the aid to ensure that it has not relieved the paro-
chial school of educational duties that it would have otherwise funded itself,
thus freeing parochial school money for religious purposes.
IV. FELTON AND THE EHA
A. The DOE Position on Felton
Despite the fact that the provision of special education and related serv-
ices under the EHA often involves on-site teacher instruction, the United
States Department of Education ("DOE") has advised state educational au-
thorities that the above limitations do not apply to the EHA. The DOE has
"taken the position that [the Felton] decision does not apply to other Fed-
eral programs. Therefore, there is currently no Federal prohibition on on-
site services under the EHA... for handicapped children.""' 5 The DOE
has affirmed this view as recently as March, 1988.16
When one examines the reasoning behind the DOE's blanket statements
of non-application, the defects in such a stance become clear. The DOE
position was first announced in a letter from then Secretary of Education,
William Bennett, to each Chief State School Officer.' 17 Secretary Bennett
prefaced his analysis by noting that the Supreme Court itself had recog-
nized the difficulty inherent in applying establishment clause decisions to
"other cases presenting different facts and circumstances."' 8 Therefore, it
would be "presumptuous," he reasoned, to extend Felton "beyond the cir-
cumstances clearly addressed by that case."" 9 As an example of such a
presumptuous extension, Secretary Bennett noted that Felton could not be
used to prohibit the placement of Chapter 2 materials and equipment in
parochial schools, since it did not address Chapter 2 materials and equip-
ment. But he then drew an important distinction, stating that "[i]n the case
of instructional services provided on private school premises under Chapter
2, State and local officials should carefully review these instructional services
in light of the Felton decision to determine whether they are so similar to
115. Hoffman Inquiry, 2 EHLR 211:405 (1986).
116. Exon Inquiry, 2 EHLR 213:125 (1988) ("[T]he Felton case has no bearing on this prob-
lem whatsoever since the [DOE] has not taken the position that the prohibition against on-prem-
ises services is applicable to programs under the [EHA].").
117. See Bennett Letter, supra note 16.
118. Id. at 373.
119. Id.
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those at issue in Felton as to require modification."120  Secretary Bennett
then attempted to apply this distinction to the EHA, stating:
Likewise, the Felton decision need not have the effect of prohibit-
ing on-premises services to private school children in all other Fed-
eral programs. With respect to programs under... the Education of
the Handicapped Act, for example, a prohibition of on-premises in-
structional services may make it impossible to provide the instruc-
tional services required [by the EHA]. The special problems and
statutory schemes for these programs were not before the Supreme
Court when it decided Felton.12 1
This reasoning implies that instructional services under the EHA are so
different from those at issue in Felton as to make the case inapplicable. Yet
the uniqueness of instruction under the EHA did not prevent it from being
"essentially the same" for purposes of delivery to parochial schools as in-
struction under Title I in the eyes of the DOE. 122
Part of the DOE's analysis of Felton is correct: The decision prohibits
on-site instructional services in the Title I program, and in any other pro-
gram, such as Chapter 2, containing instructional services similar to those
at issue in Felton. It does not apply to non-instructional services not ad-
dressed by the Court that do not present the threats of indirect subsidiza-
tion, indoctrination, symbolic union, or entanglement. The DOE's error
occurs in the application of this interpretation to instructional services
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. Id.
122. After Felton, the Department of Education announced that "the Felton decision is clear
in prohibiting the provision of instructional services under [Title I] within private religious school
buildings." Bennett Letter, supra note 16. In 1979, however, state directors of special education
received a letter from the DOE concerning the application of the EHA to children unilaterally
placed in parochial or private schools. Informal Letter to State Directors of Special Education
(Aug. 24, 1979) reprinted as DAS Bulletin #39, 2 EHLR 203:07 (1979). The letter contained a
review of key requirements for the implementation of the EHA, one of which stated:
Methods/Settings for Services. The requirements for serving private school handi-
capped children under Part B are essentially the same as the requirements for serving
private school educationally deprived children under Title I of the ESEA. Thus, if a
State's Title I services are provided through a variety of arrangements (e.g., dual enroll-
ment, mobile educational services, and services on private school premises) it would be
legally permissible to use the same arrangements under Part B [of the EHA].
Id.
The same response had also been issued in March of that year in reply to an inquiry from the
Pennsylvania Catholic Conference. See Aschenbrenner Inquiry, 2 EHLR 211:110, 111 (1979).
State educational authorities, therefore, may have been seeing the logical reverse of the DOE's
own parallel, that if on-site services are impermissible under Title I, they are impermissible under
the ERA since the two are "essentially the same" for the purposes of delivery. However, these
past comparisons were either ignored or overlooked by the DOE when it formulated the current
policy on Felton and the EHA.
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under the EHA, which fails to recognize the different types of services and
instruction provided by the EHA. By reapplying Ball and Felton to the
EHA with these differences in mind, a clearer, more logical picture of the
implications of these decisions emerges.
B. Possible Effects of Felton on the EHA
Obviously a major concern with banning on-site instructional services is
that it might make it impossible to provide the special education required
by the EHA to parochial school children.123 Such concerns, however, are
perhaps overstated. Certain on-site programs are likely to be valid while
others are clearly prohibited.
Some unique aspects of the EHA stand outside the realm of Felton. For
example, handicapped children are entitled to both special education and
related services. Related services, defined as "such developmental, correc-
tive, and other supportive services as are required to assist a handicapped
child to benefit from special education," '124 are tailored to each handicapped
child's special needs, and often entail little substantive content. Such highly
individualized programs that can only be provided on the parochial school
site are much less likely to involve effects and entanglement problems, since
they are less instructional in nature and have little educational content
which could be used to transmit ideological views to the child. Thus, where
a child requires toileting and writing assistance, for example, there is a good
chance that the on-site provision would be upheld. 25
While it is true that not all services received by handicapped children
under the EHA are instructional in nature, 126 many types of handicaps,
such as learning disabilities, might necessitate supplemental classes similar
in form to those at issue in Felton. For this type of special education, the
dangers pinpointed by the Court in Ball and Felton might still be present.
The substantive content of such classes provides the opportunity for inad-
vertent student indoctrination by public school teachers, which in turn trig-
gers the need for the type of surveillance which creates entanglement.
Depending on the method and extent of implementation, such classes could
present the appearance of symbolic church-state union and have the effect
of indirect subsidization as well.
123. See Bennett Letter, supra note 16.
124. 34 C.F.R. § 300.13 (1988).
125. See, eg., In re Board of Educ., 1984-85 EHLR DEC. 506:309 (SEA N.Y. 1984).
Some support for this assertion may be found in the Court's willingness to uphold general
welfare services for children in parochial schools. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 242-43
(1977); cf. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 371 n.21 (1975).
126. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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Depending on the method and extent of delivery, on-site instructional
services under the EHA could be perceived as a link between church and
state in the eyes of students and the public. Such aid might indirectly subsi-
dize the religious functions of the parochial school if the school would nor-
mally have made provision for special education and related services as part
of tuition, or class size could be reduced. Finally, teachers providing special
education are just as likely to inadvertently incorporate religious teaching in
their instruction, and handicapped children are just as susceptible to influ-
ence by such indoctrination.127 Consequently, monitoring would be re-
quired to guarantee the secularity of state aid, resulting in entanglement
problems.
Since it is difficult to imagine that the Court would ignore these dangers,
simply because the children involved are "handicapped" under the EHA
and not "educationally disadvantaged" under Title I, the reasonable as-
sumption made by state educators is that such general instructional classes
may not be provided on parochial school grounds under the EHA. Indeed,
many school districts have already made this assumption and adopted poli-
cies against providing on-site services at parochial schools. 28
C Options Available for Provision of Services
The difficult position the school district finds itself in is that its decision
to discontinue on-site services at parochial schools does not negate that dis-
trict's obligation to provide special education programs for children in those
schools.29 There are, however, available options.
Direct off-site service is an obvious option. If a child requires the type
of special education and related services which may not be provided on
parochial school grounds, the district is obligated to provide transportation
to the public site so that the student may participate.'3 0 In fact, the DOE
127. Indeed, some handicapped children might be more susceptible.
128. See, eg., Board of Educ. v. Wieder, 72 N.Y.2d 174, 527 N.E.2d 767, 531 N.Y.S.2d 889
(1988) (district policy against providing public services on religious school ground upheld);
Wheatland Unified School Dist. and Yuba County Superintendent of Schools, 1986-87 EHLR
DEC. 508:310 (SEA CA. 1987) ("The school district cannot provide speech therapy on the [paro-
chial] school site because that would be in violation of the establishment clause of the First
Amendment .... "); School Dist. of North Platte, 1985-86 EHLR DEC. 507:452 (SEA Neb. 1986)
("[In response to U.S. Supreme Court decisions ... district concluded it could no longer offer
special education services at parochial school site.").
129. See 34 C.F.R. § 76.654(a); see also supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text. Note that
the Court has upheld the provision of therapeutic services, guidance, and remedial classes for
parochial school children on public school grounds. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 244-45 n.123.
130. Wheatland Unified School Dist., 1986-87 EHLR DEC. 508:310 (SEA CA. 1987). But
see Prince George's County Pub. Schools, 353:226 EHLR (1986) (Office of Civil Rights letter
indicating no obligation to provide transportation).
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has recently stated the "general rule that services will only be offered at the
public school site and that the.., schools are not responsible for providing
transportation to any private school child who is handicapped is inconsis-
tent with the Federal regulations."' 13 1 The local public school retains con-
siderable flexibility in identifying the appropriate site.132
Felton also appears to allow limited on-site services. On-site instruc-
tional programs should be limited in number. Where a school system has
only a few children in private educational placements, monitoring of on-site
programs could avoid establishment clause problems. It is conceivable that
a particular school system has one or two children so placed, and therefore
the Supreme Court's concern that a school system, monitoring itself, creates
excessive entanglement is not justified.
Further, on-site programs limited in scope should survive attack. To
the extent the program does not confer educational benefit, but is a service
which allows the education to take place, it seems likely to be permitted.
Providing trained aides to change a catheter, or to assist a child in toileting
have little educational content and hence, little possibility of running con-
trary to Felton's concerns. To the extent the assistance could involve edu-
cational content, however, it is likely to be impermissible. For example, a
cued speech interpreter for a deaf student should not be provided, since the
person would be interpreting material with educational content 3 3 as well as
interpreting classes with specific religious content.
On-site programs, however, involving traditional as well as non-tradi-
tional educational content (such as education in self-help and survival
skills) 34 should be prohibited in all but a few instances. Whether a child is
being tutored in reading, or is being trained to make change, or even to help
feed him or herself, the risk of establishment problems exist. Only two
groups of students, therefore, in addition to those merely receiving on-site
related services (as opposed to educational programming) should be served
on-site by the public schools. First, on-site services should be provided for
131. Exon Inquiry, 2 EHLR 213:125, 126 (1988).
132. See Wieder, 72 N.Y.2d 174, 527 N.E.2d 767, 531 N.Y.S.2d 889. A community of
Hasidic Jews sought provision of special educational services within the Hasidic schools or at a
neutral site. The public school sought a ruling that the EHA and New York law required provi-
sion of special education only in public schools. The court held that there was neither a constitu-
tional right to have the services performed at the private school or a neutral site, nor was the
public school limited to providing services at a public school site. Id.
133. "Cueing involves the use of handshapes with the ongoing speech to clarify the spoken
language. Cueing is not intended to be a substitute for spoken language, as is sign language."
Chattahoochee County Bd. of Educ. v. Tremaine S., 1986-1987 EHLR DEC. 508:295 (SEA Ga.
1987).
134. See, eg., Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1983).
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children whose cognitive ability is such that their education cannot entail
concepts such as church and state. Risks of the teacher imparting inappro-
priate content are minimal and the small number of children who require
any minimal monitoring should avoid entanglement problems.135 Second,
children who are at risk from travel involved in leaving the parochial school
should be served on-site.
Again, given the small number of such children, the ease of monitoring,
and the inherent risks attendant to the transportation of the child, little
entanglement should exist in these two instances.1 36 In fact, the number of
such children the public system would be required to educate is made even
smaller by the fact that many children with severe cognitive deficiencies
require total special education, rather than a few classes or some form of
related service. For these students, the issue is probably moot. To the ex-
tent that a child placed in a private school requires exclusively special edu-
cation and related services, the public school is probably relieved of any
obligation to provide special education and related services if it has an ap-
propriate program in the public school.137
Finally, as an option for providing special education, it seems likely that
the public school could meet its burden by providing direct payment to the
parents for services, rather than providing the money or services to the pa-
rochial school. To the extent, for example, that the child is required to have
a tutor to enable the child to receive educational benefit, the public school
could provide the parents with the funds to hire the tutor themselves. Such
an approach seems consistent with the United States Supreme Court's posi-
tion in Mueller v. Allen,138 where the Court upheld a state tax deduction for
costs of tuition and related expenses at a parochial school. Any entangle-
ment problems resulting from supervision might be minimal. In fact, in
Mueller, the tax provision also provided for state review of text books used
in the parochial school.
The Supreme Court's decision in Committee for Public Education v. Ny-
quist,139 however, makes it difficult to state categorically that Mueller
would allow a system of direct payment to parents. Nyquist involved tui-
135. Many children functioning at this level, to the extent they are not in a public school
program, are likely to be in private residential facilities receiving special education.
136. Cf. Macomb Intermediate School Dist., 1988-89 EHLR DEC. 401:117 (SEA MI 1988)
(school required to provide climate controlled bus to transport child from regular school program
to special half-day special education program site).
137. Work v. McKenzie, 661 F. Supp. 225 (D.D.C. 1987).
138. 463 U.S. 388 (1983); see also Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474
U.S. 481 (1986).
139. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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tion reimbursement grants to parents of parochial school children. The
Court held that, had the funds been given directly to the religious schools,
the establishment clause would have been violated because there would be
no guarantee that state aid would be used for secular purposes. The fact
that the aid was given directly to the parents did not make the statute con-
stitutional since the effect, financial support of sectarian schools, remained
the same." Nyquist, however, was distinguished in Mueller by Justice
Rehnquist because aid was conferred on parochial schools only as a result
of parental decision, not state action. The decision has been called "iso-
lated" by one commentator. 4 '
V. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the United States Department of Education's position
to the contrary, Felton raises significant problems for public educational
agencies. For children who simply cannot be served anywhere except on-
site at the parochial school, Felton should provide little difficulty. For the
vast majority of children, however, Felton should prohibit on-site program-
ming under the EHA, just as it does under Chapter I. With creative plan-
ning, however, school systems, working with parents, should be able to
meet the educational needs of children who have elected parochial school
education.
140. Id. at 780-81. The same result was reached in Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973)
(another tuition reimbursement scheme).
141. See, eg., R. ALLEY, THE SUPREME COURT ON CHURCH AND STATE 142 (1988).
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